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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Spencer Jay Maschek appeals from the judgment entered upon the
district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlying Criminal Proceedings
In February 2008, a vehicle belonging to Maschek "was found burned in
Devil's Corral in Jerome County." (R., p.103.

1
)

When contacted by the police,

Maschek initially reported that the vehicle had been stolen.

(Id.)

In a

subsequent police interview, Maschek admitted that he had "made arrangements
with Patrick Morrisey to take the vehicle and burn it." (R., p.104.)
The state charged Maschek with conspiracy to commit arson. (R., p.104;
Exhibits:

2

Criminal Complaint, filed 3/6/08, and Information for a Felony, filed
3

5/20/08.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Maschek entered an Alford plea to the
conspiracy charge and the state agreed to recommend a unified sentence of
eight years, with four years fixed. (R., p.105; Exhibit: Offer-Plea Agreement, filed
8/7/08.) The state also agreed to recommend that the sentence be suspended

1

The facts of the underlying criminal case are derived, in part, from the factual
statement set forth by the state below in its "Statement Of Claimed Undisputed
Material Facts" (see R., pp.103-07), which Maschek has also adopted, in part, as
his statement of facts on appeal (see Appellant's brief, pp.3-4).
2

At the state's request, the district court took judicial notice of 32 documents
from the underlying criminal case. (R., pp.110-12; Tr., p.12, L.6 - p.14, L.4.)
Those documents have been included as exhibits to the record on appeal. (See
R., pp.136-37 (Certificate Of Exhibits).)
3

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

1

and that Maschek be placed on supervised probation for four years, with the
condition that he "meaningfully participate in and comply with the requirements of
Mental Health Court." (Id.) In the event Maschek was not accepted into Mental
Health Court, the state agreed "to limit itself to a period of retained jurisdiction,
not actual penitentiary time to be served." (Id.)
Maschek was ultimately denied admission into Mental Health Court. (R.,
p.105.)

Consistent with the state's agreed-upon recommendation, the district

court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with four years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., p.106;

also State v. Maschek, Docket No.36580,

2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 370 (Idaho App., March 3, 2010).)

At the

conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court relinquished
jurisdiction and ordered Maschek's sentence executed. (Id.) The court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction was affirmed on appeal. (Id.)

Statement of Facts and Course of the Post-Conviction Proceedings
Maschek filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and
supporting affidavit, alleging numerous claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. (R., pp.4-32.) At Maschek's request, the court appointed counsel to
represent Maschek in the post-conviction proceedings.

(R.,

pp.33-46.)

Appointed counsel thereafter filed an amended petition, restating the claims in
the original petition but presenting no new factual allegations or supporting
evidence.

(R., pp.77-79.)

As "concisely [re]stated," the amended petition

alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for, inter alia:

2

(iii)

Failure to move to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea, pursuant
to I.C.R. 11, after petitioner was denied admittance into
Mental Health Court[;]

(iv)

Failure to adequately explain the entirety of the plea
agreement and what would happen if petitioner was denied
entrance into Mental Health Court[; and]

(v)

Failure to move to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea, pursuant
to !.C.R. 11, after the court relinquished jurisdiction at the
rider review hearing.

(R., pgp.77-78.)
The state answered the amended petition and moved to summarily
dismiss it, arguing that the claims therein were conclusory, disproven by the
record and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.80-109.) After
a hearing, the district court granted the state's motion and dismissed the
amended petition in its entirety.

(R., pp.116-18.)

The court entered its final

judgment of dismissal on December 14, 2010. (R., pp.119-20.) Maschek timely
appealed. (R., pp.121-24.)

3

ISSUE
Maschek states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied post
conviction relief without considering the record which established
Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, or, in the
alternative, Petitioner is entitled to post conviction relief since his
attorney failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea when he did not
receive probation despite the court's express advice that he could.
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Maschek failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims?

4

ARGUMENT
Maschek Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims

A

Introduction
The district court dismissed Maschek's amended post-conviction in its

entirety, ruling that the claims in the petition were either conclusory or disproved
by the record, or both. (R., pp.116-18; Tr., p.17, L.18 - p.23, L.1.) On appeal,
Maschek challenges the dismissal of only the three ineffective assistance of
counsel claims "concerning the plea agreement" and/or his guilty plea.
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) With respect to those three claims, Maschek argues that
he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing or, alternatively, post-conviction relief
because, he contends: (1) the district court relied solely on misrepresentations
of the prosecutor and did not consider evidence that he contends supports his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and (2) the underlying criminal record
establishes his ineffective assistance of counsel claims as a matter of law or, at
the very least, raises a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an
evidentiary hearing on each of his claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-26.)
Maschek's arguments fail. He has failed to show error in either the scope
of the district court's review of the relevant evidence or its application of the law
to the facts in concluding that Maschek failed to carry his burden of presenting a
genuine issue of material fact to overcome the summary dismissal of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner1s favor, would require relief to be granted.
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Nellsch v.
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992).

C.

Maschek Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Based On His
Claims That The Prosecutor Misrepresented The Record And That The
District Court, Relying On The Alleged Misrepresentations, Failed To
Consider Evidence Relevant To His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Claims
Maschek argues that the

prosecutor in

the

post-conviction

case

misrepresented the record by citing only to portions of the change of plea
hearing that were favorable to the state's position, and that the district court,
"believing that the state was accurately portraying the record, simply relied on it"
in dismissing Maschek's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
brief, pp.22-25; see

(Appellant's

p.15 ("Presumably, the post conviction court did not

read the entire transcript of the change of plea hearing, but just relied on the
state's misleading version of it appearing in its brief.").) - Maschek's arguments
are without merit. While the state below did cite to only a portion of the change
of plea hearing in its brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal (R.,
pp.94-96), the state also specifically requested that the district court take judicial
notice of the entire transcript of the change of plea hearing on which the state's
arguments were based (R., pp.110-12). The district court did so (Tr., p.12, L.6p.14, L.4) and quoted directly from that transcript, not from the state's brief, in

6

dismissing Maschek's petition (Tr., p.1

12

p .19, L. 15). Maschek's claims

on appeal that the district court "simply relied on" the state's representations of
the record and "did not read the entire transcript of the change of plea hearing"
are wholly unfounded.
Even if the district court had relied solely on the state's representations of
the record in dismissing Maschek's ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
Maschek has failed to show that such reliance would, by itself, constitute any
basis for reversal.

"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief

application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and
admissions together with any affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (dting Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76,
80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

Because this Court conducts an independent

review of the record to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate,
Maschek's attacks on the integrity of both the prosecutor and the district court
are not only factua!ly unsupported, they are also legally irrelevant

D.

Maschek Has Falied To Show Error In The District Court's Determination
That Maschek Failed To Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
Entitling Him To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Of His Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Claims
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima fade case as to each element of the

7

claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's
claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing
I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court
must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to
relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to
dismissing the petition.

~

(citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d

1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for
the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the
original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

~

As relevant to this appeal, Maschek's amended petition alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective for not adequately explaining the plea agreement to him
and for not filing a motion to withdraw Maschek's plea, either after he was denied
admission to Mental Health Court or after the district court relinquished
jurisdiction and ordered his sentence executed. (R., p.78; see also pp.11-12, 2023 (statements in Maschek's affidavit pertaining to ineffective assistance of

8

counsel claims at issue).)

overcome summary dismissal of these claims,
that "(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed]

Maschek was required

as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of
fact exist[ed] as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [Maschek's] case." Baidwin
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 1

P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations

omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice). To establish deficient performance, the
burden was on Maschek "to show that his attorney's conduct fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
strong

This objective standard embraces a

presumption that trial counsel was competent and

diligent."

!ft

"[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless
those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law,
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation."

Id.

To establish

prejudice, Maschek was required to show "a reasonable probability that but for
his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different."

kl

Application of the foregoing legal standards to the facts of this case
supports the district court's order of summary dismissal; Maschek failed to
demonstrate from his pleadings and evidence that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

9

1.

Maschek Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Explain The Plea Agreement

Maschek entered his guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. (Exhibit:
Offer-Plea Agreement, filed 8/7/08.) The written agreement, signed by Maschek
on August 7, 2008, required Maschek to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit first
degree arson. (Id.) In exchange, the state agreed to recommend a prison term
of "4 years determinate plus 4 years indeterminate, for a total of 8 years." (Id.)
The state also agreed to recommend that the sentence be suspended and that
Maschek be placed on supervised probation for four years, with the condition
that he "meaningfully participate in and comply with the requirements of Mental
Health Court (MHC)." (Id.) Finally, as is relevant to this appeal, the state agreed
that if Maschek was "not accepted into MHC, the state [would] limit itself to a
period of retained jurisdiction, not actual penitentiary time to be served." (Id.)
Ultimately, Maschek was denied admission to Mental Health Court. (R.,
p.105.) Consistent with the terms of the state's agreed-upon recommendation,
the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with four years fixed,
and retained jurisdiction.

(R., p.106.)

At the conclusion of the retained

jurisdiction period, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered
Maschek's sentence executed. (Id.)
In his amended post-conviction petition, Maschek alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to "adequately explain the entirety of the plea
agreement and what would happen if petitioner was denied entrance into Mental
Health Court." (R., p.78.) The district court summarily dismissed this allegation,
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ruling that it was both without factual support and disproved by the record. (Tr.,
p.19, L.16-p.20, L.12.) The court explained:
The offer/plea agreement sets forth that Mascheck [sic] had read
the offer, that he understood it, and that he accepted the offer on
its stated terms.
As I've already noted, a term of the plea offer was that if
Mascheck [sic] was not accepted into Mental Health Court, the
state would limit itself to a period of retained jurisdiction.
Also, the change of plea advisory form sets forth that
Maschek had discussed all the ramifications of his case with his
lawyer and had discussed fully with his lawyer the nature of the
charge and Maschek's constitutional rights and defenses to the
charge, including the possible consequences.
As such, this
allegation is disproved by the record and is dismissed.
(Tr., p.19, L.22 - p.20, L.12.) Contrary to Maschek's assertions on appeal, a
review of the record supports the district court's determination that Maschek
failed to demonstrate a genuine issue material fact entitling him to an evidentiary
hearing on this claim.
The only "evidence" Maschek offered to support his claim that counsel
failed to adequately explain the plea agreement consisted of his own self-serving
statements that defense counsel promised him that "he would be placed in the
'Mental Health Court' program or be placed on probation, with a condition of
continuing counseling" (R., p.19,

,-r 40); "[w]hile discussing the plea agreement

and the entry of an "Alford Plea" with Defense Counsel prior to the entry of the
plea, [he] was instructed to answer the Judge's question as 'just a formality"' and
"to give answers as though [he] was entering a willing guilty plea" (R., p.21, ,1~ 47
and 48); and defense counsel promised him that he "would be receiving
probation so long as [he] did as instructed" (R., p.21, ,I 49). As found by the

11

district court, however, the record of the underlying criminal proceedings clearly
disproves Maschek's claims. The plea agreement itself very clearly set forth the
state's obligations with respect to its sentencing recommendation and specifically
provided that, if Maschek was "not accepted into MHC, the state will limit itself to
a period of retained jurisdiction, not actual penitentiary time to be served."
(Exhibit: Offer-Plea Agreement, filed 8/7/08.)

Maschek signed the agreement

and, in so doing, attested: "/ have read the offer, I understand it, and I accept
the offer on the above-stated terms." (Id. (bold and italics original, underline

added).) He also filled out and signed a guilty plea advisory form in which he
affirmatively indicated that he was satisfied with his attorney's services and that
his attorney had fully discussed with him the possible consequences of his guilty
(Exhibit: Change Of Plea Form -

plea.

Alford Plea, filed 817/08, p.2.)

Significantly, Maschek also acknowledged understanding that, as a result of
pleading guilty, he could be "imprisoned in the State Penitentiary" and his
"sentence may be imposed with no right to probation."

(Id., p.3 (emphasis

added).)
In addition to being contrary to his own statements in the plea advisory
form that he was satisfied with counsel's performance, had fully discussed with
counsel the possible consequences of his guilty plea and understood that a
prison sentence could be imposed with no right to probation, Maschek's claim
that counsel failed "to adequately explain the entirety of the plea agreement and
what would happen if [he] was denied entrance into Mental Heath Court" also

12

stands in contrast with the statements he made at the change of plea hearing.
At the hearing, the district court conducted the following coHoquy:
COURT:]
Mr. Maschek, I want to first talk to you
about this plea agreement. I know you have read it. I know you
have signed it, but it's important that I make sure that you
understand what you're committing to, or that you understand what
the state's commitment is, I should say.
That commitment is this: That if you plead guilty to this
charge this morning, the state will be recommending to the court a
unified sentence of eight years, consisting of four years fixed, four
years indeterminate. What that means is that should that sentence
ever be imposed, you would have to serve a minimum of four years
in the Idaho State Penitentiary before your would be eligible for
parole. After that, during the second four year portion, parole
would be up to the parole board.
Do you understand that that's the consequence or the
meaning of that sentence?
[Maschek]:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:
The state is going to recommend that
that sentence be suspended and that you will, as a condition of
probation, participate in the mental health court program here in
Twin Falls. I'm assuming that Mr. Williams [defense counsel] has
explained in some detail what that means?
[Maschek]:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:
That program is an intensive program.
It is probably at least a one year program. It may be longer. It
requires a great commitment on your part for weekly meetings and
numerous other things.
Is that kind of generally your
understanding of that program?
[Maschek]: Yes, sir, it is my understanding is it's kind of
like very intense probation.
THE COURT:

That's probably a good explanation of

that.
Do you understand that there are some hoops that you have
to go through before you can be considered for mental health

13

court? In other words, you have to be evaluated by the mental
health court staff, you have to meet the diagnosis qualifications,
that I don't have anything to do with that. In other words, I certainly
will follow these - I've told your counsel I will follow these
recommendations and ask that you be put in mental health
court, but I cannot control that. If for some reason you don't
qualify, then what happens is you come back before me for
sentencing and we look at some alternatives.
Do you
understand that?
[Maschek]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT:
So there is a little bit of a gamble if
you will, to you. Do you understand that?
[Maschek]:

Yes.

THE COURT:
And if you're not allowed to get into
mental health court, your plea in this case will still stand; in
other words, you can't withdraw it. Do you understand that?
[Maschek]:

Yes, sir.

(Exhibit: 8/7/08 Tr., p.3, L.13 - p.5, L.18 (emphasis added).) Later in the plea
colloquy the following exchange took place:
THE COURT:
... [l]f it became necessary to actually
sentence you in this case because you were not accepted into
mental health court - well, let me rephrase it this way. Do you
understand that's the maximum penalty that could be imposed in
this case [a 25-year prison sentence and a $100,000 fine]?
[Maschek]:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:
Again, I have told your attorneys,
pursuant to a chambers conference that we had yesterday, that
since this matter is presented to me as a Rule 11 plea agreement
that I will honor the recommendations of the state to place you on
probation. Do you understand that if for some reason something
would come up and I would change my mind about that, that I
would allow you to withdraw your plea of guilty?
Do you
understand that?
[Maschek]:

Yes, sir.

14

THE COURT:
of Mr. Williams?
[MaschekJ:

Are you satisfied with the representation

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:
Is there anything that he has not done
that you believe that he should do?
[Maschek]:
(Exhibit: 8/7/08 Tr., p.8,

No, sir.
.20 - p.9,

16.)

The record of the change of plea hearing, in conjunction with the plea
agreement itself and Maschek's statements on the plea advisory form,
demonstrate that Maschek understood the terms of the plea agreement,
including the "what would happen if [heJ was denied entrance into Mental Health
Court." (R, p.78.) The district court went over the terms of the agreement and
confirmed that Maschek understood that the state would be recommending
probation and Mental Health Court but, if Maschek did not qualify for Mental
Health Court, the court would "look at some alternatives." (Exhibit: 7/8/08 Tr.,
p.3, L.19

p.5, L.13.) The court advised Maschek that, under the terms of the

plea agreement, he could face up to eight years in prison, a fact which Maschek
said he understood.

(Id., p.3, L.19 - p.4, L.6.)

Maschek also acknowledged

understanding that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea if he was not
accepted into Mental Health Court. (Id., p.5, Ls.14-18.) Toward the end of the
plea colloquy the court told Maschek that it "would honor the recommendations
of the state to place [him] on probation" but, if the court changed its mind about
that, it would allow Maschek to withdraw his plea. (Id., p.9, Ls.1-9 (emphasis
added).)

As dictated by the clear terms of the plea agreement, previously
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explained by the court and acknowledged by Maschek earlier in the change of
plea hearing, however, the state's obligation to recommend probation was
contingent upon Maschek's acceptance into Mental Health Court. (Id., p.4, L.7 p.5, L.18.)

Otherwise, the record demonstrates, Maschek understood that he

could face imposition of a prison sentence, "with no right to probation." (Id.,
p.3, L.19 - p.5, L.18; Exhibit: Change of Plea Form - Alford Plea, filed 8/7 /08,
p.3.)
The allegations in Maschek's amended petition and affidavit relating to his
understanding of the plea agreement, particularly the allegation that he was
promised probation, were clearly contradicted by his own signed statements in
both the written plea agreement and the plea advisory form and were also
contrary to his statements at the change of plea hearing.

Because the

allegations were disproved by the record, they did not create a genuine issue of
material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522,
164 P.3d at 802 (post-conviction allegations insufficient for granting of relief
when they are clearly disproved by the record); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360,
368, 924 P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996) (same). Maschek has failed to show
error in the summary dismissal of this claim.

2. Maschek Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him To
An Evidentiary Hearing On Either Of His Claims That Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To Move To Withdraw His Plea
Maschek alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
withdraw his guilty plea at two separate stages of the proceedings - "after
[Maschek] was denied admittance into Mental Health Court," and "after the court
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relinquished jurisdiction
dismissed both of

the rider review hearing." (R., p.78.) The district court
claims, ruling that Maschek failed to make even a prima

facie showing that such motions, if made, would have been granted. (Tr., p.18,

L.12 - p.19, L.15,

13 - p21, L.7.) Maschek has failed to show error

the district court's rulings.
When a defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion, "the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion in
question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent
performance." Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, _ , 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App.
2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct.
App.1996)). "Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial
court, is generally

inative of both prongs of the Strickland test."

at

266 P.3d at 1172-73.
Motions to withdraw a guilty plea are governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which
provides:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition
of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and
permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
Pursuant to this rule, a motion to withdraw made before sentencing may be
liberally granted, but must be granted only if the defendant proves either that the
plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made or that there is another
just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530,
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535-36, 211 P.3d 775, 780-81 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118
Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). A motion to withdraw a
guilty plea after sentencing should be granted only to "correct manifest injustice."
I.C.R. 33(c). Application of these standards to Maschek's claims that counsel
was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw his plea both pre- and postsentencing supports the district court's determination, based upon evidence
before it, that such motions would have been denied.
Maschek alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
withdraw his plea after he was denied admission to Mental Health Court, but he
did not allege any facts that, if true, would have entitled him to withdraw his plea
at that state of the proceedings. He did not allege that his plea was involuntary
in the sense that he did not understand he could be denied admission to Mental
Health Court and, in fact, the record of the underlying criminal proceedings
shows the opposite. When asked by the district court whether he understood
that there was no guarantee he would qualify for Mental Health Court, Maschek
replied, "Yes, sir."

(Exhibit:

7/8/08 Tr., p.4, L.23 - p.5, L.13)

He was also

explicitly advised, and affirmatively acknowledged understanding, that being
rejected for admission to Mental Health Court would not afford him any basis to
withdraw his plea.

(Id., p.5, Ls.14-18.)

Having failed to allege any facts to

demonstrate that his plea was involuntary or that there existed any other just
reason to withdraw his plea after he was denied admission to Mental Health
Court, Maschek failed to make even a prima facie showing that counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw Maschek's plea.
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On appeal, Maschek argues
on his

"is entitled to relief as a

that counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to withdraw

guilty plea after he was denied admission to Mental Health Court
criminal court told him he could withdraw his guilty plea if he was not placed on
probation." (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.)
and misconstrues the pleadings.

Maschek's argument is nonsensical

The amended petition alleged only that

counsel was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw Maschek's plea "after [he]

to move to withdraw the plea when the court sentenced Maschek to a period of
retained jurisdiction.

Because the claim in the petition was limited to an

allegation that the denial of admission to Mental Health Court was itself a basis
for withdrawal of the plea, whatever promises the court may have made about
the ultimate sentence

to be imposed are irrelevant and do not entitle Maschek to

relief. 4
Alternatively, Maschek argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the claim because the criminal court, by failing to advise Maschek
that he could be sent on a rider but not be placed on probation afterward, failed
to adequately explain the consequences of his guilty plea in violation of I.C.R.

11. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-22.) Again, this argument is irrelevant to the claim
actually made in the petition -- that the failure to be admitted into Mental Health
Court was itself a basis for withdrawal of the plea.

4

Moreover, a review of

As set forth in more detail below, the state does not concede that the court
promised to place Maschek on probation regardless of whether he was admitted
to Mental Health Court.
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Maschek's pleadings shows that Maschek never alleged a failure of the district
court to comply with I.C.R. 11 as a basis for withdrawal of his plea.
generally R., pp.4-32, 77-79.)

(See

It is well settled that "'[t)he trial court is not

required to search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine
issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required to
bring that evidence to the court's attention."' Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469,
224 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics
Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008)).

Because

Maschek never alleged a violation of !.C.R. 11 as a basis for withdrawing his
plea, and because such an allegation is ultimately irrelevant to Maschek's claim
that counsel should have moved to withdraw his plea based solely on the fact
that he was denied admission to Mental Health Court, Maschek has failed to
show any basis for reversal.
Maschek has also failed to show any basis for reversal of the district
court's order summarily dismissing his claim that counsel was ineffective for not
moving to withdraw his plea "after the court relinquished jurisdiction at the rider
review hearing."

(R., p.78, ,T(v).)

Maschek would only have been entitled to

withdraw his plea after sentencing upon a showing that the withdrawal was
necessary "to correct manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c). As found by the district
court, however, "[tJhe record is absolutely devoid of any fact establishing any
manifest injustice in this case which would have been sufficient to support
Maschek's withdrawal of a guilty plea well after judgment was pronounced and

20

sentence imposed."

1,

appeal, a review of the record

3-7.) Contrary to Maschek's assertions on
the district court's determination.

The only evidence Maschek presented to support his claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw his guilty plea after the court
relinquished jurisdiction was the following statement made by the court at the
change of plea hearing:
Again, I have told your attorneys, pursuant to a chambers
conference that we had yesterday, that since this matter is
presented to me as a Rule 11 plea agreement that I will honor the
recommendations of the state to place you on probation. Do you
understand that if for some reason something would come up and I
would change my mind about that, that I would allow you to
withdraw your plea of guilty?
(Exhibit: 7/8/08 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-8;

R., p.22,

,m 51 and 53 (quoting court's

statement at change of plea hearing).) Maschek acknowledges on appeal that
the district court also advised Maschek that he could not withdraw his plea if he
was denied admission to Mental Health Court.

(Appellant's brief, p.21.)

He

argues, however, that "the two apparently contrary statements of the criminal
court can actuaHy be reconciled" in his favor. (Id.) Specifically, he contends:
While the first statement of the criminal court advised that if
he was not admitted into Mental Health Court he could not
withdraw his guilty plea, the second statement advised that if the
court was not going to place him on probation, it would allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, Mr. Maschek could withdraw his
plea after his rider when jurisdiction was relinquished, because it
was at that point that something had come up which made the
court change its mind about placing him on probation.
(Id., pp.21-22.)

Maschek's interpretation of the court's statements, while

creative, is belied by a plain reading of the record.

Contrary to Maschek's claim on appeal, the district court did not advise
him that "if the court was not going to place him on probation, it would allow him
to withdraw his guilty plea." (Appellant's brief, p.22.) Rather, the court stated
that it would "honor the recommendations of the state to place [him] on
probation" but, if the court changed its mind about that, it would allow Maschek

to withdraw his plea. (Exhibit: 7/8/08 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-9 (emphasis added).) When
the court made this statement, it had already explained to Maschek that the
state's obligation to recommend probation was specifically contingent upon
Maschek being accepted into Mental Health Court. (Id., p.4, L.7 - p.5, L.6.) It
had also explained to Maschek that, if he was not accepted into Mental Health
Court, the court would look at other sentencing alternatives, and Maschek would
not be permitted to withdraw his plea. (Id., p.5, Ls.6-18.) Thus, while the state
agrees with Maschek that the court's statements did not conflict, the state
disagrees that there is any logical way in which the statements can be reconciled
in Maschek's favor. Viewed in context, the court's statement to Maschek that it
would permit him to withdraw his plea if it did not honor the state's
recommendation for probation was merely a promise to place Maschek on
probation if he was accepted into Mental Health Court; it did not confer upon
Maschek a right, or even a reasonable expectation, that he would be permitted to
withdraw his plea if, upon being denied admission to Mental Health Court, he
was not placed on probation.
Maschek failed to allege any facts or present any evidence to
demonstrate entitlement to either the pre-sentencing or post-sentencing
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withdrawal

his plea. Having failed to do so, he has

the

dismissal of his claims that counsel was ineffective for not moving

to

to show any error in

raw his plea.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Maschek's petition for post-conviction relief.
rd
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